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A long-standing theoretical debate concerns the involvement of principled reasoning versus relatively
automatic intuitive-emotional processing in moral cognition. To address this, we investigated
whether the mental models formed during story comprehension contain a moral dimension and
whether this process is affected by cognitive load. A total of 72 participants read stories about ﬁctional
characters in a range of moral situations, such as a husband being tempted to commit adultery. Each
story concluded with a “moral” or “immoral” target sentence. Consistent with a framework of efﬁcient
extraction of moral information, participants took signiﬁcantly longer to read immoral than moral
target sentences. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect was not compromised by cognitive load.
Our ﬁndings provide evidence of efﬁcient coding of moral dimensions during narrative comprehen-
sion and demonstrate that this process does not require cognitively intense forms of principled
reasoning.
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Human moral cognition is currently a signiﬁcant
focus of neuroscientiﬁc inquiry (Greene &
Haidt, 2002; Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza,
Krueger, & Grafman, 2005), yet little remains
known about the emotional and cognitive
processes involved. In particular, one important
yet outstanding issue is whether processing of
moral information is a relatively automatic
process or whether it requires signiﬁcant cognitive
effort (Greene & Haidt, 2002).
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2009, 62 (1), 41–49The study of moral judgement in both psychol-
ogy and philosophy has been largely dominated by
rationalist models that emphasize an important
role for conscious reasoning in the judgement
process. These models maintain that individuals
make decisions about what is right or wrong by
applying explicit reasoning principles to the
particular circumstances of a given situation.
Examples of two prominent theories grounded
ﬁrmly in this type of thought are Piaget’s and
Kohlberg’s theories of moral judgement in child
development. Also consistent with this class of
model is the suggestion that theory-of-mind jud-
gements can be used as input in the moral cogni-
tive process (Knobe, 2005). For example, if we
are wondering whether we should blame a
person for his behaviour (a moral judgement), we
might ﬁrst want to know whether his behaviour
was intentional (a theory-of-mind judgement).
Other models have questioned the assumption
that formal reasoning gives rise to moral behaviour
and action and have placed a greater emphasis on
the role of intuition and emotion in moral judge-
ment (Greene, 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002;
Haidt, 2001; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Kang-
Xing,&Mikhail,2007).These“social intuitionists”
assume that people often make moral judgements
without weighing personal concerns or ethical
values, such as fairness and the law, and that
moral judgements result from quick and automatic
evaluations, or intuitions, instead. Support for this
class of model comes from studies of “moral dumb-
founding”, in which people have strong moral
reactions without any plausible, rational principle
that explains their reaction. To take an example
described by Haidt (2001), imagine a scenario in
which a sister and brother mutually consent to
“sleep together” without anyone else knowing,
with no harm done to either. Many people have a
very strong negative reaction to this scenario yet
cannot explain why using principled moral
reasoning. Such ﬁndings, amidst others, have led
Haidt (2001) to deﬁne moral intuition as the
sudden emergence of an affectively valenced (e.g.,
good/bad) moral judgement in consciousness,
with no awareness of the process of weighing evi-
dence to arrive at some conclusion. This type of
interpretation is consistent with the broader belief
in the ﬁeld of social cognition that manybehaviours
andjudgementsaremadeautomaticallyandwithout
intention, effort, or awareness of process (Bargh &
Chartrand, 1999). It is also consistent with earlier
psycholinguistic work on memory for the pragmatic
implications of sentences. In this research, individ-
uals often recognize or recall the implications of
sentences rather than their actual content
(Johnson, Bransford, & Solomon, 1973). Thus,
when presented with the sentences “John was
trying to ﬁx the birdhouse. He was pounding the
nail when his father came out to watch him and
helphimdothework”,participantsfalselyrecognize
the original sentence as having explicitly stated that
a hammer was used. Similar effects have been
reported for a wide range of materials.
One way to distinguish and evaluate the oppos-
ingreasoningandintuitionmodelsofmoralproces-
sing would be to deﬁne controlled circumstances
under which a situation requiring a moral judge-
ment is implied, but not explicitly stated, and to
test how efﬁciently it is assimilated. This would
indicate whether processing of moral information
shares certain characteristics with other mental pro-
cesses considered to be “automatic”. As noted
above, the emerging view in social cognitive and
linguistic research is that many behaviours and jud-
gements are relatively automatic; moral judgements
might also be particularly habitual and susceptible
to this kind of automation. The inability of individ-
uals to provide a sound explanation for a particular
moral stance may suggest involvement of emotion
in moral processing, but it does not provide
strong evidence of relatively automatic or efﬁcient
processing of moral information.
We adapted a paradigm used previously to
investigate whether or not readers represent char-
acters’ emotional states during story comprehen-
sion (Gernsbacher, Goldsmith, & Robertson,
1992, 1998). Research has demonstrated that
when people read stories, they form rich cognitive
representations of the events, people, and settings
described within; these representations have been
termed situational or mental models (Johnson-
Laird, 1983). To determine whether the emotional
states of ﬁctional characters are also represented in
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leagues conducted experiments in which partici-
pants read stories that implied, though never
explicitly stated, a character’s emotional state.
Each story concluded with a target sentence that
contained explicit reference to an emotion that
either matched or mismatched the implied
emotional state. For example, when reading a
story about a woman who had just made her
weekly visit to a nursing home and had learned
that one of its residents had died, a reader
forming an “online” representation of the charac-
ter’s emotional state during story comprehension
will have incorporated the sadness the woman
should be feeling into their mental model. The
reader would subsequently be expected to read a
matching target sentence (“She couldn’t remember
when she’d felt this much sadness”) faster than a
mismatching target sentence (“She couldn’t
remember when she’d felt this much joy”)
because the ﬁrst sentence would be more readily
incorporated into the reader’s mental model.
Gernsbacher et al. (1992) obtained this effect
and argued that the kind of rich situational
models formed during comprehension do indeed
include attributes of characters’ emotional states.
Analysis of reading times for narrative outcomes
has also been employed in other contexts. For
example, Rapp and Gerrig (2006) demonstrated
that participants were slower to read outcomes
that were inconsistent with prior story contexts
and preferences.
In the present study, we applied a similar
reading-time methodology to a range of moral
situations, such as a husband being tempted by
his secretary to commit adultery. Each story con-
cluded with either a moral or an immoral target
sentence. If readers interpret the stories within a
“moral” schema or framework during comprehen-
sion, then moral outcomes should be encoded
more readily than immoral outcomes. This
would subsequently be reﬂected in faster reading
times for ﬁnal matched sentences that describe a
moral relative to an immoral outcome.
Insofar as any observed tendency for readers to
process moral information in this way might be
considered “automatic”, it has been suggested
that this term does not refer to a single process
that can be studied using a particular method or
paradigm. Bargh and Chartrand (2000) maintain
that a number of distinct qualities fall within this
broad umbrella category of information proces-
sing: (a) whether an individual has some awareness
of the operation of the process under consideration
(e.g., moral processing); (b) whether the process is
efﬁcient; (c) whether the process is unintentional;
and (d) whether the process is under conscious
control. In the present study, we focus primarily
on the second of these qualities of automaticity,
the efﬁciency of moral processing. A process that
is relatively unaffected by a reduction in conscious
attention or cognitive resources for its successful
operation could be regarded as efﬁcient. One
reliable method that has been used as a measure
of efﬁciency of processing has been to manipulate
a task’s attentional demands and subsequently to
observe whether this manipulation affects per-
formance of the primary task. We manipulated
task demands by comparing performance with
and without a memory load presented at the
beginning of each story. Initially, 24 participants
completed the task with no memory load and 24
with a low memory load. To address whether
increasing the memory load further had a signiﬁ-
cant effect on performance, a higher load was
used with an additional 24 participants. For
brevity, all three conditions are presented in
the same methods and results sections. If moral
attributes of readers’ mental models are encoded
efﬁciently, the reading time (RT) difference for
immoral relative to moral target sentences should
not be affected by memory load. However, an
overall increase in reading times with increasing
memory load would verify that the load is having
its desired effect.
Method
Participants
A total of 72 adults were recruited from the
Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit Volunteer
Panel and were paid for their participation. All
participants reported English as their ﬁrst
language, and verbal IQ was estimated from
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Test (NART; Nelson, 1982). The data from
one participant in the high-load condition were
excluded from analysis as this participant’s
reading-time data were abnormally long (i.e.,
more than 3 standard deviations above the
average). Descriptive statistics for the remaining
71 participants are provided in Table 1.
Participants in the no-load, low-load, and high-
load conditions did not differ in terms of the
proportion of female to male participants, or in
terms of age, F(2, 68) ¼ 0.77, p ¼ .47, hp
2 ¼ .02,
or verbal IQ, F(2, 68) ¼ 2.14, p ¼ .13, hp
2 ¼ .06.
Materials and procedure
In pilot work, 24 experimental stories were devel-
oped to reﬂect a diverse range of moral themes, as
reﬂected in Shweder and colleagues’ (Shweder,
Murch, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997) distinction of
morality into different ethics or moral codes. The
24 stories were organized into 12 pairs such that
both stories in each pair could conclude sensibly
with either of two ﬁnal target sentences, generat-
ing a “moral” and an “immoral” ending for each.
These story endings were achieved by altering
one word (in the example in Table 2, “wrong” to
“right”). Further, the main characters were of the
same sex in each pair and had names with the
same number of syllables. Each story-pair was
carefully written so that the same target sentence
(e.g., “Jessica/Valerie thought about the situation
and decided it would be wrong for her to do it”)
would conclude one story in thepair with the char-
acter acting in a moral way and the other with the
character acting in an immoral way (see Table 2).
Thus, a target sentence that included the word
“wrong” could be either moral or immoral concep-
tually, depending upon the context of the rest of
the story. In this way, the “morality” of the ﬁnal
target sentence (i.e., moral or immoral condition)
was always contingent on the preceding text.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of
four different computer-presented scripts.
Within each script, the same target sentence was
used for both stories in a moral–immoral pair
(with the exception of the character’s name). To
take the pair of stories presented in Table 2 as an
example, if Computer Script 1 used “Jessica (or
Valerie) thought about the situation and decided
it would be wrong for her to do it” as the target
sentence for both stories in the pair, Computer
Script 2 used “Jessica (or Valerie) thought about
the situation and decided it would be right for
her to do it” as the target sentence for both
stories in the pair. In addition to allowing com-
parison of RTs within participants for “moral”
and “immoral” target sentences of identical
lengths, reversing the morality of both sentences
in the pair across scripts ensured that morality
was not confounded with valence across partici-
pants. Scripts 3 and 4 were identical to Scripts 1
and 2, respectively, but with experimental and
ﬁller stories presented in the reverse order to
control for any order effects.
All four scripts presented the 24 experimental
stories in a pseudorandom order, interleaved with
24 ﬁller (or moral-neutral) stories. The ﬁllers
were those used by Gernsbacher et al. (1992):
These were originally written for readers of
American English and so were modiﬁed for
British readers where necessary. The ﬁller stories
were moral neutral.
Participants weretestedindividually in asession
lasting approximately one and a half hours.
Following a short practice session, participants
were instructed to read the 48 stories at a natural
reading rate, one sentence at a time. Participants
pressed the spacebar to proceed from one sentence
Table 1. Mean sample characteristics of participants in the
cognitive load absent and present conditions
Sample characteristic
N Age (years)
n female:
n male Verbal IQ
Reasonable
sentence
completions
(%)
No load 24 21.2 (0.8) 11:12 109.0 (1.2) 92.4 (4.0)
Low load 24 20.4 (0.5) 12:12 110.1 (1.3) 93.8 (2.0)
High load 23 21.7 (0.8) 13:11 112.7 (1.4) 92.0 (4.6)
Note: Standard errors of the mean are in parentheses. Verbal IQ
was estimated according to the National Adult Reading Test
(NART; Nelson, 1982).
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recorded. RTs for the ﬁnal, target sentence consti-
tuted the dependent variable. Participants were
told that at the end of a selection of stories, they
would be prompted to supply a reasonable con-
cluding sentence to verify that they were attending
to and comprehending each story’s content. The
ﬁller stories were used for this purpose. No
mention of morality or moral processing was
made to participants.
Each participant completed one of three exper-
imental conditions: (a) no cognitive load, (b) low
cognitive load, or (c) high cognitive load. In the
“no-load” condition, participants were asked to
read through the scripts as detailed above. In the
“low-load” condition, participants were given a
memory load in the form of a trigram, or string
of three letters (e.g., SDV), at the beginning of
each story. This cognitive load was present for
the duration of the story and associated target sen-
tence. Participants were prompted to write down
the remembered trigram once they had ﬁnished
reading the target sentences for a selection of
stories, though they had no knowledge of the
stories on which the prompts might occur. Trials
in which the letters and order were recalled
accurately were recorded as “correct”. For the
high-load task a six-digit memory load (e.g.,
372815) was used. This provided a more stringent
test of processing efﬁciency, on the basis of
previous studies that have made claims about auto-
maticity of social cognitive processes using this
same cognitive load (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000;
Bargh & Tota, 1988; see also Lavie, 2005, for a
discussion of its use in cognitive tasks).
Moreover, in the “high-load” condition, a six-
digit memory load was presented at the beginning
of each story, and every target sentence ended with
a prompt to write down the corresponding digit
sequence. The digit task also had the added advan-
tage over the trigram (low-load) task in that the
to-be-remembered stimuli could not be trans-
formed into pronounceable nonwords or recogniz-
able acronyms, although every attempt had also
been made to ensure that this was not the case
for the low (trigram) load task.
Results
Inordertomakeclaimsabouttheefﬁciencyofmoral
processing in particular, it was important to show
that our secondary tasks (memory loads) were of
sufﬁcient difﬁculty to adversely inﬂuence partici-
pants’ overall performance on the primary task
(reading times). The most representative measure
of this variable was each participant’s average
reading time (RT) across all story sentences. A
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) conducted
on each participant’s average RT per sentence
showed a signiﬁcant main effect of cognitive
Table 2. Sample pair of experimental stories (with moral and immoral target sentences)
Experimental story pair
A. Jessica had just moved in with her new boyfriend, Ben, and his daughter. Jessica’s new life was idyllic as she was living in a
beautiful house and no longer had to work. One night she came back early from an evening out with her friends. She discovered
Ben physically abusing his daughter. She mentioned the situation to a friend who urged her to report Ben to the police.
Moral target sentence
Jessica thought about the situation and decided it would be right for her to do it.
Immoral target sentence
Jessica thought about the situation and decided it would be wrong for her to do it.
B. Valerie had been married to Daniel for over a year. Unfortunately due to his job, she saw very little of him during the week.
Recently she had noticed how attractive Daniel’s best friend was. The friend occasionally came to her house to use Daniel’s
computer. She had all the opportunity she needed to seduce him while Daniel was at work.
Moral target sentence
Valerie thought about the situation and decided it would be wrong for her to do it.
Immoral target sentence
Valerie thought about the situation and decided it would be right for her to do it.
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2 ¼ .12, with
increased overall RTs observed for increasing
cognitive loads (no load ¼ 2,586 + 135; low
load ¼ 2,656 + 122; high load ¼ 3,345 + 292).
Further analysis demonstrated a signiﬁcant linear
trend across memory load, t(68) ¼ 2.73, p ¼ .004,
one-tailed, with an overall increase in RTs from
noloadtothreeletterstosixdigits,andnoquadratic
effect, t(68) ¼ 1.30, p ¼ .2 (i.e., no signiﬁcant devi-
ation from the linear). To exclude the possibility
that increased RTs reﬂected an interaction
between cognitive load and morality/immorality
of the ﬁnal sentence alone, a one-way ANOVA
was also computed for the average RTs of all
sentences except the ﬁnal target sentences; the
main effect of cognitive load on this RT measure
was again found to be signiﬁcant, F(2, 68) ¼ 4.75,
p ¼ .012, hp
2 ¼ .12.
To examine RT differences for moral and
immoral target sentences for each participant
assigned to the no-load, low-load, and high-load
conditions, mean RTs and standard errors were
calculated separately for matched moral and
immoral story endings; these mean RTs are pre-
sented in Figure 1. RT data were analysed using a
2  3 repeated measures ANOVA with story
ending (moral, immoral) as a within-participants
factor and cognitive load (no load, low load,
high load) as a between-participants factor. The
main effect of story ending was signiﬁcant, with
participants taking longer to read immoral
than moral endings, F(1, 68) ¼ 17.19, p , .001,
hp
2 ¼ .20 (see Figure 1). In line with the signiﬁcant
effect of cognitive load on overall RTs reported
above, the main effect of cognitive load on RTs
for ﬁnal target sentences alone, F(2, 68) ¼ 2.51,
p ¼ .08, hp
2 ¼ .07, reﬂected a signiﬁcant linear
trend, t(68) ¼ 2.17, p ¼ .017 (one-tailed), with
no signiﬁcant deviation from the linear,
t(68) , 1. Critically, the interaction between cog-
nitive load and story ending was not signiﬁcant,
F(2, 68) , 1, hp
2 ¼ .012. Thus, there was no evi-
dence that slower RTs for immoral than for
moral story endings were affected by the presence
and size of the memory load.
For the low-load condition, 85.9 + 13.1% of
trigrams were recalled correctly upon prompting,
whereas for the high-load condition, 80.2
+ 21.4% of digits were recalled correctly.
These levels of free recall are comparable to those
reported by Gernsbacher and colleagues
(Gernsbacher et al., 1998) who employed both a
four-consonant recognition-based memory load
(88% accuracy) and a four-consonant cumulative
memory load (81% accuracy) during narrative
comprehension.
Across all participants, 92.7 + 17.5% of com-
pletion sentences were found to be consistent with
story content, indicating good comprehension; the
percentage of acceptable completions did not vary
signiﬁcantly with cognitive load, F , 1, p . .5,
hp
2 ¼ .002 (see Table 1).
Discussion
Our study provides new evidence that readers form
mental models or representations that include
information about the morality of ﬁctional charac-
ters during narrative comprehension. We reasoned
that if mental models of the thoughts and beha-
viours of ﬁctional characters are interpreted and
represented within a moral framework, increased
RTs should be observed for target sentences that
conﬂict with this framework. This hypothesis
was conﬁrmed: Participants took signiﬁcantly
longer to read ﬁnal target sentences that described
Figure 1. Mean reading times and standard errors of the mean for
moral and immoral target sentences in the no-, low-, and high-
cognitive-load conditions.
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effect was observed under conditions where both
the length and valence of the target sentence
were tightly controlled. This was achieved by
pairing identical target sentences with different
stories in order that the same sentence was inter-
preted as describing a moral or immoral
outcome, depending on its preceding context.
Increased RTs were also observed in the absence
of any explicit instruction to attend to the moral
implications of the particular events, behaviours,
and thoughts described in the stories, suggesting
that readers include this sort of information in
their mental models without explicit intention.
The present results accord with previous ﬁndings
demonstrating that readers form rich represen-
tations that incorporate implied cognitive and
emotional elements of narrative (Gernsbacher
et al., 1992). Of more signiﬁcance, they inform
an important ongoing theoretical debate in the
moral cognition literature.
Some theoristsconsidermoral judgements tobe
madeprimarilyonthebasisofprincipledreasoning
(Knobe, 2005; Kolhberg, 1969; Pizarro & Bloom,
2003), whereas others argue that quick and auto-
matic evaluations, or intuitive-emotional pro-
cesses, are critical in the judgement process
(Greene, 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt,
2001). This was addressed by administering a con-
current low or high memory load to two thirds of
our participants (three letters or six digits) for the
duration of each story, including the ﬁnal target
sentence. Increasing cognitive load was found to
increase reading time, as would be expected.
Critically, however, there was no signiﬁcant
effect of load on the differential RTs for immoral
and moral target sentences, the measure of the
extent to which morally relevant information is
integrated into the reader’s mental model. Thus,
ﬁnding that cognitive load does not interact with
this immoral–moral differential indicates that the
construction of a person’s moral status is an efﬁ-
cient process that persists with an experimental
reduction in cognitive resources.
It is important to emphasize that we are not
claiming that the absence of an effect of cognitive
load is speciﬁc to moral processing. Our experiment
was designed to differentiate between two compet-
ingtheoretical approachestomoral processing.One
proposes that moral judgements are made on the
basis of principled logical reasoning (Kolhberg,
1969; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003), the other that auto-
matic intuitive-emotional processes are used
(Greene, 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt,
2001). As discussed, our ﬁndings favour the latter.
Moreover, consistent with the proposal that moral
judgements often have an emotional basis, it is of
interest that extraction of emotional information
from emotion-based narratives is also resistant to
similar cognitive loads (Gernsbacher et al., 1992).
By contrast, cognitive load has been shown to inﬂu-
ence the construction of mental models in other
circumstances. For example, research into stereo-
type formation, in which participants read character
descriptions followed by target sentences describing
stereotype-consistent or stereotype-inconsistent
behaviours, showed that reading times for the con-
sistent and inconsistent target sentences interacted
with cognitive load (Sherman, Lee, Bessenoff, &
Frost, 1998).
Researchers in the area of social cognition have
shown that many social psychological phenom-
ena—including attitudes, evaluations and
impressions, emotions, and social behaviour—
occur automatically and without awareness
(Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). The present ﬁndings
suggest that the same may be true for moral pro-
cessing. As emphasized in the introduction, auto-
maticity should not be considered as a single
process, but one that has multiple components
(Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). We have provided
evidence that at least one of these components
applies to moral processing: It is an efﬁcient
process that persists despite a signiﬁcant cognitive
load. Given that our participants were not expli-
citly instructed to attend to moral aspects of the
narrative content, our data indicate that another
component of automaticity may also apply, that
moral processing can under some circumstances
occur without intention. Whether the processing
of moral information shares further features of
automaticity (e.g., whether it is under conscious
control) is more difﬁcult to assess and remains to
be determined.
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process moral information in an efﬁcient manner,
they do not address the content of this processing.
Allbritton and Gerrig (1991) have suggested that
online processing may take the form of participa-
tory or p-responses, a running commentary that
occurs as the narrative unfolds, due to involvement
in the text. To illustrate, in the example given
above where a husband is tempted to commit
adultery, the idea is that readers would hear an
inner commentary that says “don’t do it!”, and
this is likely to have implications for reading
times of the moral or immoral target sentence.
A further interesting question is whether readers’
mental models are based on their own personal
moral or immoral attitudes and behaviours, or
whether they are based on declarative knowledge
of what is right and wrong. It is often the case
that an individual who practises dubious morals
may still possess adequate knowledge of what
others consider to be right or wrong. This
appears to be the case in the study of moral cogni-
tion in certain patient groups, such as psychopaths
and patients with frontal lobe damage, where dis-
sociations between explicit knowledge of how to
behave and actual socially desirable behaviour
have been observed (Anderson, Bechara,
Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999; Damasio,
1994; Richell et al., 2003). Given that demand
characteristics are frequently at play in the exper-
imental setting, a major beneﬁt of the type of para-
digm adopted in the present study is that it
provides a more subtle or implicit way of assessing
the extent to which people assimilate moral
knowledge and information. Moreover, the
present approach could thus be useful in the
study of moral cognition in these and other
patient groups, which in turn may also contribute
to our developing understanding of the neural
basis of moral psychology.
In summary, these ﬁndings address the long-
standing theoretical debate regarding the involve-
mentofexplicitreasoningversusintuitive-emotional
processing in moral cognition. They provide
support for the involvement of efﬁcient, rela-
tively automatic, and potentially intuitive pro-
cesses in the construction of representations of
implied moral dimensions in interpreting social
scenarios.
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